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During the annual meeting of the research network “Alternatives to Capitalism” 
held at the New School for Social Research in New York City in 2019, Professor Nancy 
Fraser engaged in a vibrant discussion about one of her latest books, “Capitalism. A 
Conversation in Critical Theory”, co-authored with Rahel Jaeggi (Polity Press, 2018).  
Here is a shortened and edited extract of her conversation with Lara Monticelli, 
Assistant Professor at the Dept. of Management, Politics and Philosophy at 
Copenhagen Business School and co-founder of the research network “Alternatives to 
Capitalism”. 
*** 
Lara Monticelli (LM): As it is clear from the title, the key protagonist of your book is 
capitalism. And your goal is to return to what you call a “large scale”, “grand type” of 
social theory, a critical theory of capitalism that explicitly aims at integrating Marxist 
critique with ecological, feminist and postcolonial critiques. To begin with, I would like to 
ask you, when did you start to envision this new intellectual project? Is it a natural 
continuation or a slight turn in terms of focus, with respect to your previous intellectual 
production? 
 
Nancy Fraser (NF): You are right that the protagonist of our book is capitalism and that 
its aim is to revive large-scale or grand social theorising. In fact, that's not at all a new 
interest for me. My world-view was formed in the New Left, way back when, and when I 
entered academia, I brought with me the firm conviction that capitalism was the master 
category or framing concept for all serious social theorizing. But as the decades wore 
on and the New Left ethos faded, I began to realize that not everyone shared that 
assumption. Rather, the default position, at least in the United States, was (and still is) 
liberalism of one kind or another, whether left-egalitarian or libertarian-individualist. As 
that realization dawned, I saw that my formative experience in the New Left had been 
an aberration, just as the 1930s had been for a previous generation of US radicals. 
These were periods in which the structural weakness of the whole social system 
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became widely apparent, leading many people to radicalize their thinking, to search out 
the deep roots of societal woes, and to identify the structural changes needed to 
overcome them. But these periods were exceptional. In “normal” times, nearly all 
Americans, including those who lean left, are focused on reforming the system, seeking 
to expand rights and opportunities within it. Let me be clear: I’m not opposed to all such 
efforts; there could be good tactical reasons to pursue certain types of reforms in 
historically specific situations. But when reformism becomes the default taken-for-
granted perspective, the effect is to direct attention away from the fundamental 
structures of the social totality. And that’s bound to be politically and intellectually 
disabling in the long run–above all in times of acute crisis, such as the present.  
Anyway, there came a point when I saw that interest in structural critique of the 
social totality was waning in progressive circles. In response, I made a series of 
interventions aimed at exposing the amnesia of political economy – showing how that 
had dropped out of feminist and anti-racist critique, out of Critical Theory in every sense, 
out of all manner of egalitarian thought. I also argued that a one-sided focus on issues 
of recognition or identity politics dovetailed with, and effectively bolstered, the process 
of neoliberalization then underway. So, I went from thinking that it was obvious to 
everyone that capitalism was the core question for critical theorizing to the realization 
that the proposition had to be argued. Aiming to confront the issue directly, I began 
trying to convince my readers to refocus their attention on capitalism. That agenda is 
front and center in this book.  
The book is also an attempt, as you noted, to integrate the best insights of 
Marxism with those of feminist and LGBTQ theory, anti-imperialist and critical race 
theory, democratic and ecological theory–in short with everything we’ve learned since 
the 1960s. As I see it, this process is not about adding new variables or “systems” to 
existing Marxian paradigms. Rather, it requires revisiting the concept of capitalism and 
thinking it differently.  
LM: In the book you start your conversation with Rahel Jaeggi by addressing the key 
question of how to define capitalism. The characteristics you describe are reflecting 
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your willingness to include in the definition of capitalism what you call “the background 
conditions of possibility” that have been the fundamental basis of capitalist development 
in the last four hundred years … 
 
NF: Right. Too many people think that capitalism is simply an economic system. That's 
the view of mainstream economists and corporate players. It's also the common sense 
of most so-called ordinary people, including progressives, and even of many self-
described Marxists. But this view of capitalism is too narrow. It obscures all the 
necessary background conditions for a capitalist economy, things on which the latter 
depends and to which it helps itself freely, but which it disavows and fails to replenish. I 
will spell out those conditions concretely in a minute. But I want to say first that anything 
that constitutes a necessary presupposition for a capitalist economy needs to figure 
directly into our definition of what capitalism is. Far from a mere “economy,” capitalism 
is something larger, an “institutionalized social order” on a par, for example, with 
feudalism. Just as feudalism was neither simply an economic system nor a military 
system nor a political system but a broader societal order that encompassed all those 
things, so the same is true for capitalism. It’s a way of organizing, not just economic 
production and exchange, but the relation of production and exchange to a wide range 
of social relations, activities and processes, viewed as non-economic, which make the 
economy possible.  In the book I describe four such non-economic background 
conditions without which a capitalist economy could not exist.  
The first is social reproduction–or, as many now call it, “carework.” Included here 
are all the activities that create, socialize, nurture, sustain and replenish the human 
beings who occupy positions in the economy. You can’t have a capitalist economy 
without “workers” who produce commodities under the aegis of for-profit enterprises. 
And you can’t have them without “caregivers” who reproduce human beings in settings 
external to the official economy. Carework includes gestation, birthing, nursing, feeding, 
bathing, socializing, educating, healing, protecting, solacing–in short, everything 
essential to sustaining beings who are at once biological and social. Historically, much 
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of this work has been unwaged and performed by women–often in households, but also 
in communities, neighborhoods and villages; in civil-society associations, public-sector 
agencies and increasingly nowadays in for-profit firms, such as schools and nursing 
homes. But wherever it’s done, social reproduction is an indispensable precondition for 
economic production–hence, for the making of profit and the accumulation of capital. 
Yet capital goes to great lengths to avoid paying for carework–or failing that, to pay as 
little as possible for it. And this is a set-up for trouble. Because capitalist societies 
incentivize business to free-ride on carework with no obligation to replenish it, they 
entrench a deep-seated tendency to social-reproductive crisis, as well as a gender 
order that subordinates women.  
A second precondition for a capitalist economy is ecological. Just as a capitalist 
economy depends on carework, so too it presupposes the availability of energy to 
power production and material substrates, including “raw materials,” for labor to 
transform. Capital relies, in short, on “nature”–in the sense, first, of specific substances 
inputted directly into production; and second, of general environmental conditions for it, 
such as breathable air, potable water, fertile soil, relatively stable sea levels, a habitable 
climate, and so on. But there’s the rub. By its very design, capitalist society incentivizes 
the owners to treats nature as a bottomless trove of “non-economic” treasure, there for 
the taking and infinitely self-regenerating, not needing replenishment or repair. This, too, 
we’ve finally realized, is a recipe for disaster. Capitalist societies institutionalize a 
structural tendency to ecological crisis–as well as profound disparities in vulnerability to 
the ensuing fallout. 
Those disparities point to a third condition of possibility for capital accumulation: 
wealth commandeered from subject populations. Almost always racialized, such 
populations are designated for expropriation, as opposed to exploitation. Deprived of 
state protection and actionable rights, their land and labor can be taken without 
remuneration and funneled into the circuits of accumulation. Expropriation is often seen 
as an early, superseded feature of a system that piles up wealth by exploiting (free) 
“workers” in factories. But that’s a mistake. Capitalist production would not be profitable 
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without an ongoing stream of cheap inputs, including natural resources and unfree or 
dependent labor, confiscated from populations subjected by conquest, enslavement, 
unequal exchange, incarceration or predatory debt and therefore unable to fight back. It 
has been said that behind Manchester stood Mississippi, meaning that slave labor 
supplied the cheap raw cotton that fed the iconic textile mills at the dawn of 
industrialization. But the same is true today: behind Cupertino stands Kinshasa, where 
coltan for iPhones is mined on the cheap, at times by enslaved Congolese children. In 
truth, capitalist society is necessarily imperialist, continuously creating defenseless 
populations for expropriation. Its economy doesn't work if everyone is paid wages that 
cover their true reproduction costs. It doesn’t work, that is, without a global color line 
dividing populations that are “merely” exploitable from those that are downright 
expropriable. By institutionalizing that division, capitalism also entrenches racial-imperial 
oppression and the political struggles surrounding it. 
This suggests a fourth background condition for a capitalist economy: public 
power–paradigmatically, but not only, state power. Accumulation can’t proceed without 
such power in its historic core: without legal systems that guarantee private property 
and contractual exchange. Also essential are repressive forces that manage dissent, 
put down rebellions, and enforce the status hierarchies that enable corporations to 
expropriate racialized populations at home and abroad. Nor can the system function, 
finally, without public regulations and public goods, including infrastructures of various 
kinds and a stable money supply. These are indispensable for accumulation but cannot 
be provided through the market. Rather, they can only be secured by the exercise of 
public power. Capital needs such power, accordingly, but it is also primed to undermine 
it–by evading taxes, weakening regulations, offshoring operations, or capturing public 
agencies. The result is a set of built-in tensions between “the economic” and “the 
political”–and a deep-seated tendency to political crisis.  
In all four cases, then, capitalist societies institute contradictory relations between 
their economies and the latter’s non-economic conditions of possibility. These relations 
become visible only when we understand capitalism broadly–not as a “mere” economic 
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system, but as an institutionalized social order that also includes social reproduction, 
nature, wealth expropriated from racialized populations, and public power–all of which 
are essential to accumulation, yet are depleted and destabilized by it. That’s the main 
point of this book: to replace the narrow definition of capitalism as an economic system 
with an expanded view of it. This approach enlarges our view of capitalism’s 
contradictions and thus explains why capitalist societies are uniquely and non-
accidentally prone to systemic crises–some of which appear to be “non-economic.” It 
also integrates socialists’ longstanding interests in exploitation with the concerns of 
feminists, environmentalists, anti-racists, anti-imperialists, and radical democrats.  
 
LM: The argumentation that you build with Rahel Jaeggi starts by focusing on the 
diachronic logic of capitalism, that is the evolution of capitalism over time. You describe 
four “regimes” or phases: mercantile capitalism, liberal capitalism, state-managed 
capitalism and the contemporary one, financialized capitalism. Embracing an historical 
approach for the study of capitalism is something that other social theorists, like 
Immanuel Wallerstein or Wolfgang Streeck, have done, but the unique feature of your 
analysis is that you interpret each new phase of capitalism as a reaction, an adjustment 
to contradictions and tensions that arose in the previous phase. In this sense, your 
approach here reminds me of Boltanski and Chiapello’s theories on the adaptive and 
co-opting capacity of capitalism. 
 
Nancy Fraser (NF): Right. Tensions are bound to arise in any form of capitalist society–
no matter exactly how and where it divides production from reproduction, economy from 
polity, society from nature, exploited from expropriated labor. Those divisions represent 
the system’s faultlines, the joints that register its contradictions, as capital destabilizes 
its own conditions of possibility. It is primed, as I said, to cannibalize carework, nature, 
public power, the wealth of racialized populations–and thus periodically to threaten the 
well-being of nearly all non-propertied people. No matter how well a given regime of 
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accumulation manages to finesse these contradictions for a time, it can never fully 
master them. Eventually they resurface, and the regime begins to unravel. What follows 
is an interregnum, a period of uncertainty between regimes, when all of the system’s 
irrationalities and injustices emerge in plain sight. In such moments, and there have 
been only a handful of them in capitalism’s 500+ year history, what emerges is not “just” 
a sectoral crisis, but a general crisis of the whole social order, which shakes the 
reigning commonsense. And that opens the door to a much wilder public space, where 
newly radicalized social actors put forth a broad array of competing ideas about what 
should replace it. Aiming to build a counterhegemony, they struggle to assemble a new 
historic bloc with sufficient heft to reorganize capitalist society–not only by restructuring 
the economy but also by remapping the latter’s relations with its “non-economic” 
conditions of possibility. The result in each such situation to date has been a new form 
of capitalism, one that addresses, at least for a while, the contradictions generated by 
the previous regime, until the new one, too, gestates its own contradictions and gives 
way in turn. This is the pattern of capitalist development to date: a succession of 
regimes, punctuated by developmental crises. Thus, we can distinguish between 
"normal politics," when a critical mass of people accepts the terms of the social order as 
given and fights to get the best deal within it – and “abnormal” politics, when the whole 
order appears shaky and comes into question. The latter situations represent rare 
episodes of relatively emphatic freedom, when we can contemplate changing the rules 
of the game.  
I’m unsure whether Boltanski and Chiapello fully share the perspective I’m 
outlining here. But you are right that there have been other attempts to periodize 
capitalism. I'm especially influenced by Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long 20th Century and 
by the French regulation school. I agree with their list of regimes: mercantilist or 
commercial capitalism, laisser-faire or liberal-colonial capitalism, state-organized or 
social-democratic capitalism, and neoliberal or financialized capitalism. But I conceive 
these regimes differently. Those thinkers focused on the relations between states and 
markets, showing how a given division between them became contested and was 
revised. That’s important, to be sure. But it’s only one of several plot lines of a larger 
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story. Regime changes comprise more than shifts in economy-polity relations; they also 
change the relation of production to reproduction, economy to nature, exploitation to 
expropriation. These other strands have been neglected in most previous 
periodizations. But they are central in mine. As I said, I’m engaged in expanding our 
understanding of capitalism so as to include gender, ecology, race and empire. And that 
requires bringing these neglected parts of the story into our periodizations. 
 
LM: In the book you describe various types of critique that have been addressed to 
capitalism: the functionalist critique, the moral critique, and the ethical critique. You add 
a fourth one, which you call the freedom critique... 
 
NF: Right. The chapter on “Criticizing Capitalism” draws largely from the work of my co-
author, Rahel Jaeggi. In the previous chapters (“Conceptualizing Capitalism” and 
Historicizing Capitalism”), I spell out the views I’ve outlined here, about what capitalism 
is and how we should understand its history. But the next question is, what (if anything) 
is wrong with capitalism? How should we criticize it? 
Well, from what I already said, you can see that one defect of capitalism is its 
proneness to crisis–its tendency to cannibalize its own presuppositions and thus 
periodically to generate rampant misery on a massive scale. So, “crisis critique,” aimed 
at disclosing the system’s built-in contradictions or crisis tendencies, is one major genre 
of critique. Its force consists in showing that the ensuing misery is not accidental but the 
result of the system’s constitutive dynamics. In recent years, however, this kind of 
critique has itself been criticized, rejected along with Marxism as “functionalist,” which 
here means economic-reductionist and deterministic. I wouldn't deny that some forms of 
Marxism deserve those labels, but let’s not throw out the baby with the bath. The times 
we are living through cry out for a critique of capitalism’s deep-seated crisis tendencies, 
whose actualizations are now painfully obvious. So I have tried to reconstruct crisis 
critique in a form that is not vulnerable to those objections. By foregrounding non-
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economic crisis tendencies (ecological, social, political), I have steered clear of 
economic reductionism. And by stressing the openness of interregnum periods, when 
hegemony unravels and both political imagination and freedom of action expand, I have 
avoided determinism.  
But as Jaeggi stresses, capitalism can also be criticized on normative grounds. 
Unlike Marx, I wouldn’t hesitate to use the morally laden term “unjust” to describe a 
social system that entrenches multiple forms of structural domination through which one 
group of people flourishes thanks to the oppression of others. The Marxian account of 
class domination, grounded in the exploitation of (doubly) free wage workers by 
capitalists at the point of production, is a case in point. But from what I said before about 
production and reproduction, you can see that gender domination is equally entrenched 
in capitalist society. And the same is true for racial and imperial oppression, given what I 
said before about exploitation and expropriation. These injustices are just as structural 
as class domination; none of them is secondary or incidental. In general, then, the 
expanded view of capitalism as an institutionalized social order entails an expanded 
normative critique of the system’s multiple inherent injustices. 
Finally, Jaeggi explores the potential of an ethical critique of capitalism. That sort 
of critique is also normative but not because it focuses on capitalism’s unfairness. Its 
focus, rather, is the system’s “badness,” its entrenchment of alienation and reification, 
which prevent us from living good lives. In other words: capitalism is a bad form of life–
not because some people are ripping off others, nor because it's eating its own tail and 
always breaking down, but because it stunts us and blocks our ability to live well. Of 
course, it’s notoriously difficult to spell out what that means–and to do so in a way that’s 
not tendentious or sectarian–that’s not, for example, Eurocentric. Jaeggi thinks she’s 
found a way to do that. Personally, I’m not so sure, although I agree we should try. It 
would be a huge loss if we were forced to abandon the critique of capitalist society as 
inherently alienating, imposing bad ways of living.  
“Freedom” critique is a way to get at these concerns without assuming a concrete 
view of the good life. The idea is that capitalism necessarily entrenches heteronomy and 
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impedes autonomy because it is inherently undemocratic. Capitalist societies remove a 
huge range of fundamental questions from collective democratic decision-making. They 
leave it to capital, or rather to those who own capital or are dedicated to its limitless 
expansion, to determine the basic grammar of our lives. Those guys decide what will be 
produced, how much and by whom; on what energic basis and through what kinds of 
social relations. As a result, they determine the shape of relations among those who 
work in production and between them and those who don’t, including their bosses, on 
the one hand, and their families, on the other. Then, too, capital investment dictates 
relations among families, communities, regions, states and collective associations, as 
well our relations to nonhuman nature and to future generations. All of these matters are 
taken off the agenda and decided behind our backs. By devolving them to capitalists 
and investors, capitalism institutionalizes heteronomy. It denies us the collective 
capacity to shape our lives. In general, then, a freedom critique directs our attention to 
the grammar of life, including its “badness” under capitalism. But it avoids getting 
embroiled in defining what’s good and bad concretely. Rather, it leaves that to socialist 
citizens to work out for themselves.  
 
LM: The fourth and final chapter of the book is entitled “Contesting capitalism”. You 
pass from criticizing capitalism to contesting capitalism. Contesting capitalism relates to 
the need to go beyond critique, to envision emancipatory strategies, subjects and 
scenarios. In this chapter, you tie together all the concepts that you have outlined in the 
book, and you "push the ball forward". The first step you take in this chapter is to 
address the question of who should be the new emancipatory subject, and what type of 
struggle this subject should engage in.  
 
NF: Yes, this last chapter mobilizes all the preceding conceptual work to analyze the 
present conjuncture. Its practical aim is to disclose the potentials in our situation for 
emancipatory social transformation. So, this is critical theorizing in the young Marx’s 
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sense as “the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age.” The task is partly 
to diagnose the contradictions and the difficulties, but also to identify those social forces 
that might coalesce behind a counterhegemonic project that could overcome them. The 
chapter surveys the various social struggles that surround us with that aim in mind.  
That interest guides my thinking about the question of an emancipatory subject.  
For me, the issue is how best to woo potential participants into an emerging 
counterhegemonic bloc with an emancipatory project. Everything I’ve said to this point 
implies that the project must be anti-capitalist–in an expanded sense. Because 
struggles over care and nature, race and politics, are just as deeply grounded in 
capitalist society as struggles over exploitation at the point of production, an anti-
capitalist bloc must articulate the concerns of feminists, environmentalists, anti-racists, 
anti-imperialists, and radical democrats with one another and with those of labor 
movements. But that still leaves open the question of how to interpellate the relevant 
actors. What mode of subjective address would best invite them to embrace that 
understanding and fight together for that project? 
It seems to me there are two possibilities. The first eschews the idea of a single 
agent of emancipation. In lieu of an overarching subject that simply subsumes the bloc’s 
various constituents, it envisions an alliance of multiple agents whose primary concerns 
differ but are rooted nevertheless in one and the same social system, which none of 
them can change on their own. What unites them is not a common subject position but 
a shared understanding of capitalist society as the deep source of their various troubles 
and as their common enemy. That diagnosis underpins solidarity and motivates 
cooperation. 
This view has some obvious advantages. Not only is it in sync with widespread 
leftish suspicions of “Leninism,” but it is relatively undemanding and unthreatening: it 
doesn’t require social actors to alter their existing political identities, but only their 
cognitive diagnoses. I wonder, however, whether that reliance on cognitive as opposed 
to affective “glue” is also a weakness. Would such an address be strong enough to hold 
11
Fraser and Monticelli: Interview with Nancy Fraser
Published by Scholars Junction, 2021
 
 
the bloc together–especially given the inevitability of pro-capitalist stratagems to divide 
and weaken it through a clever mix of enticing carrots and repressive sticks?  
A second possibility could afford some stronger “glue” but would be a harder sell. 
The thought here is to address the same set of social forces just identified, but in a 
somewhat more unified way: as differently situated constituents of an expanded working 
class. That idea follows, too, from the expanded view of capitalism, which discloses 
capital’s structural reliance on social-reproductive and expropriated labor, as well as on 
exploited labor. (I’m leaving aside what Jason W. Moore calls “the work of nature,” 
which may be a bridge too far.) If accumulation requires all three types of labor, then all 
three types of “workers” comprise capitalism’s working class, which also includes the 
very large number of people who perform work of more than one type. Seen this way, 
the working class is constitutively gendered and racialized as well as inherently global. 
Unlike standard views of it, which center on majority-ethnic men who work in factories, 
mines and construction, the expanded working class also includes people of color, 
women, and migrants; housewives, peasants, and service workers; those who receive a 
wage and those who don’t. 
The advantage here is a political subject that can plausibly claim a measure of 
unity and generality, while remaining internally differentiated and able to accommodate 
specificities. The effect could be to strengthen the solidary cohesion of an anti-capitalist 
counterhegemonic bloc. But this approach is considerably more demanding–it requires 
a cognitive-cum-affective leap beyond the current self-understandings of many people. 
Perhaps the strong showing of Bernie Sanders in two US presidential campaigns shows 
that such a leap is not impossible, at least under relatively favorable conditions. 
But of course there’s no predicting whether, and if so, how, either of these two 
scenarios will unfold. 
 
LM: You recognize that not all the alternatives to current financialized capitalism are 
necessarily emancipatory, but can be also regressive. It’s easy to think of examples, 
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ranging from the past presidency of Donald Trump in the USA to the ethno-nationalism 
of Narendra Modi in India, and passing from the case of Orban in Hungary to Salvini in 
Italy. What is fascinating, though, is your claim that even social movements that appear 
to be progressive can, in reality, turn out to be regressive. Which type of “test” should 
social movements then successfully pass in order to be labeled, according to your 
heuristic device, as progressive? 
 
NF: Well, I have to begin by noting that all these interventions, progressive as well as 
regressive, are unfolding in a hegemonic vacuum. So, the political field is incredibly 
messy. Antonio Gramsci put it well: "the old is dying but the new cannot be born. In the 
interregnum all sorts of morbid symptoms appear." You couldn’t ask for a better 
characterization of the current landscape! 
Now, as to the straightforwardly regressive side of this landscape, I want to make 
two heretical observations. First, the supporters of the rightwing movements and parties 
you mentioned are looking to their states, or rather to the strongmen who personify their 
states, for social protection from the forces that are wrecking their lives, forces they 
don’t rightly or fully understand. Thus, these parties and movements, however 
misguided and authoritarian, embody a revolt against neoliberal commonsense–against 
the mantra, repeated ad nauseum for decades, that markets alone can free us, that 
state power is not the solution but rather the problem. Implicitly, therefore, even the 
scariest right-wing movements harbor a revaluation of public power. And that’s 
something that a sophisticated Left could conceivably build on.  
Second, there's something hollow about the Trumps, Bolsonaros, Modis, 
Erdogans, Salvinis and so on. These guys remind me of “The Wizard of Oz.” They are 
like showmen who preen and strut in front of the curtain, while the real power hides 
behind it. The real power is, of course, capital: the mega-corporations, large investors, 
banks and financial institutions whose unquenchable thirst for profit condemns billions 
of people across the globe to stunted and shortened lives. What’s more, the showmen 
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have no solutions to their supporters’ problems; they’re in bed with the very forces that 
created them. All they can do is distract with stunts and spectacles. As the impasses 
worsen and their “solutions” fail to materialize, these front men are driven to up the ante 
with ever more outlandish lies and vicious scapegoating. That dynamic is bound to 
escalate until someone pulls back the curtain and exposes the sham.  
And that’s precisely what the mainstream progressive opposition has failed to do. 
Far from unmasking the powers behind the curtain, the dominant currents of “the new 
social movements” became entangled with them. I’m thinking of the liberal-meritocratic 
wings of feminism, anti-racism, LGBTQ+ rights, environmentalism, etc., which have 
operated for many years as junior partners in a “progressive neoliberal” bloc that also 
included “forward thinking” sectors of global capital (IT, finance, media, entertainment). 
So, they, too, served as front men, albeit in a different way–by casting a veneer of 
emancipatory charisma over the predatory political economy of neoliberalism. I’m 
tempted to call this “rainbow-washing” because it combines pink-washing with green-
washing and more.  
But whatever we call it, the result was not emancipatory. It’s not “just” that this 
unholy alliance ravaged the life conditions of the vast majority and thereby created the 
soil that nourished the Right. In addition, it associated feminism, anti-racism, etc., with 
neoliberalism, ensuring that when the dam finally broke, and masses of people rejected 
the latter, many of them they would also reject the former. And that is why the principal 
beneficiary, at least so far, has been reactionary rightwing populism. It’s also why we 
are now trapped in a political impasse, caught up in a sham diversionary battle between 
two sets of rival front men, one regressive, the other progressive, while the powers 
behind the curtain laugh all the way to the bank. Returning to Gramsci, I’d say that “the 








LM: The book ends with a call to form a new counter-hegemonic alliance, described as 
a strategy of separation in the service of realignment. You call it progressive populism. 
What do you mean by "a strategy of separation"? And which kind of realignment are you 
referring to? 
 
NF: Your question requires some comment on three key terms: separation, realignment, 
and populism. Let me start with separation. I’m actually proposing a strategy that 
encompasses two separations: one that busts up the progressive neoliberal alliance I 
just described; and one that busts up the reactionary neoliberal bloc that opposes it. 
The first separation requires splitting off the majority of women, people of color, 
LGBTQ+ people, and environmentalists from the liberal corporate forces that have held 
them hostage for decades. The second involves splitting off those segments of the 
rightwing base that could in principle be won over to a Left. The split off elements from 
both sides would then be available for a new realignment.  
Of course, this strategy, too, is based on heresy. It rejects the reigning liberal 
commonsense which says that the fascists are at the door so, leftists must shelve their 
radical ambitions, move to the center, and close ranks with liberals. It also opposes the 
much-repeated view that current polarizations are so entrenched that there’s no chance 
of winning majority-ethnic working-class voters away from the Right. Both these views 
are wrong and counterproductive. The first is a scare tactic that was used in the US last 
year to drive Bernie Sanders prematurely out of the Democratic presidential primary. 
The second is self-disabling, a recipe for defeat. As I see it, this is a time for splitting, 
not unity, because the fascists are not really at the door, and the only way to keep them 
away from it is to offer their working-class supporters a progressive anti-capitalist 
alternative. Likewise, current alignments are not really set in stone. On the contrary, 
voters are highly volatile; they try on different political postures to see what works. In the 
US, for example, a hefty chunk of those who voted for Trump in 2016 had earlier voted 
for Obama and/or Sanders and returned to the Dems in 2020. In Brazil, likewise, many 
Bolsonaro supporters had earlier voted for Lula and Rousseff and are poised to vote for 
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Lula again. Analogous trajectories have unfolded in Britain, France, and Italy. Contra 
progressive-neoliberal ideology, then, many rightwing voters are not “principled” racists 
but only “opportunistic” racists: they will vote for a racist when no one else is offering a 
pro-working-class line but are otherwise potentially in play. It would be the height of folly 
to write them off as “deplorables” instead of trying to woo them.  
That brings me to realignment. Let’s suppose that that the key components of 
any new political bloc are the split off elements just described. What could entice them 
to join together? Where is the “glue” that’s strong enough to overcome the intense 
animosity that now divides them?  
One possibility, invoked in the book, is leftwing populism. But my understanding 
of that phrase differs from that of some other thinkers, including Chantal Mouffe. For 
me, populism is neither an inherent feature of politics as such nor a desirable political 
goal. It is rather a transitional formation that often emerges in situations of hegemonic 
crisis. It’s centered on the rejection of ruling elites and can assume two principal forms. 
Right-wing populism combines opposition to elites with demonization of a despised 
underclass, while valorizing “the people” caught between them in the middle. Left-wing 
populism trains its fire on the top, refrains from scapegoating the bottom, and defines 
“the people” inclusively, as encompassing both middle and bottom. That’s one huge 
difference between the two variants. Another is that right-wing populism identifies his 
enemies in concrete identitarian terms–as, for example, Muslims, Mexicans, Blacks, or 
Jews. By contrast, leftwing populism defines its enemies numerically–as, for example, 
the 1% or the billionaire class. On both points, leftwing populism is massively preferable 
to its rightwing counterpart. But it’s not analytically precise. To really understand what is 
going on, you need a much more refined class analysis; you need the concept of capital 
and the expanded view of capitalist society.  
For me, then, leftwing populism harbors both possibilities and limitations. On the 
possibility side, it can sometimes serve as a transitional formation that wins victories, 
widens its reach, deepens its societal critique, and becomes more radical. But can it 
educate people in the course of struggle, clarifying the system they’re fighting, and 
16




explaining exactly how that system is “rigged”? My guess is that left populism offers an 
accessible entry point into class struggle. I’m less sure that it can succeed in generating 
genuine insight as to how the system really works and what really needs to be done in 
order to change it.  
That’s why I’m now inclined to contemplate prospects for a successor formation 
to leftwing populism–one whose perspective is more “analytically precise” and politically 
demanding. One such perspective, which some in the US call “democratic socialist,” 
invites potential participants to see themselves as members of an expanded working 
class in the sense I defined before. The trick would be to satisfy two imperatives that are 
often counterposed as incompatible, but that must be accommodated simultaneously: 
first, the need to cultivate a robust sense of shared class membership, premised on a 
common systemic enemy; and second, the need to acknowledge the reality of internal 
class differentiation–especially along the axes of gender, race, and nation. If that 
sounds difficult, it’s not impossible–thanks to the expanded view of capitalism I’ve 
elaborated here. That view posits a single social system that feeds off of divisions, 
created by it, among the exploited, the expropriated, and the domesticated–and various 
combinations thereof. A realignment premised on that understanding would be a 
powerful force for emancipatory transformation. 
In any case, my current view is that leftwing populism is a relatively spontaneous 
response to crisis. As such, it can and should be worked with. But it is best understood 
as a transitional waystation en route to a more radical emancipatory project. The latter, I 
maintain, should be anti-capitalist in the expanded sense.   
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